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CNRS, Séminaire d’Epistémologie Comparative, Aix-en-Provence (France)
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Department of Philosophy, Columbia University, New York, New York (USA)
(Published in Philosophical Studies 100 (2000), 217–236)
Abstract. This paper analyses topological variants of mereological essentialism, the the-
sis that an object cannot have different parts than the ones it has. In particular, we exam-
ine de dicto and de re versions of two theses: (i) that an object cannot change its external
connections (e.g., adjacent objects cannot be separated), and (ii) that an object cannot
change its topological genus (e.g., a doughnut cannot turn into a sphere). Stronger forms
of structural essentialism, such as morphological essentialism (an object cannot change
shape) and locative essentialism (an object cannot change position) are also examined
1. INTRODUCTION
Your left and right hands are now touching each other. This could have been
otherwise; but could your hands not be attached to the rest of your body?
Sue is now putting the doughnut on the coffe table. She could have left it in
the box; but could she have left only the hole in the box? Could her
doughnut be holeless? Could it have two holes instead? Could the doughnut
have a different hole than the one it has?
Some spatial facts seem tainted by necessity. This is problematic, since
spatial facts are a paradigm of contingency. But the intermingling of space
and modality may be surprisingly intricate. To a degree this is already visible
in the part-whole structure of extended bodies. Parthood, itself a prima facie
extrinsic relation, has an uncertain modal status. And questions about the ne-
cessity or the contingency of spatial facts and relations seem to run parallel
to questions about the necessity or the contingency of parthood relations.
Consider: Could an object have different parts than the ones it as?
Common sense has an easy, affirmative answer to this question. However,
2there are philosophers who, pressed by the need to overcome difficult co-
nundrums concerning the identity of spatio-temporal particulars, have cast
doubts on the adequacy of the common-sense answer. In recent years, for
instance, Roderick Chisholm [1973, 1975, 1976] has defended the radical
view that a true individual can neither gain nor lose parts, so that each single
part is essential to it—a view that has come to be known as mere logical es-
sentialism.
Let us picture to ourselves a very simple table, improvised from a stump
and a board. Now one might have constructed a very similar table by
using the same stump and a different board, or by using the same board
and a different stump. But the only way of constructing precisely that ta-
ble is to use that particular stump and that particular board. It would
seem, therefore, that that particular table is necessarilymade up of that
particular stump and that particular board. [1973: 582-583]
This is by no means an uncontroversial view.1 It does, however, have some
philosophical appeal and it is not in itself utterly implausible. Strictly speak-
ing, if the parts change, so does the whole.
Now, mereology accounts for one basic way of conceiving of an ob-
ject’s spatial structure, its decomposition into parts. But this basic account
can be extended in various ways by further distinguishing how the parts can
be related to the whole (and to one another). Some parts can lie in the interior
of the whole; others can reach out to the surface. Some parts can overlap;
others can be connected to one another without sharing any parts. Even the
notion of a whole that we get by reasoning exclusively in terms of parthood
can be significantly enhanced by distinguishing between wholes that are all
in one piece, such as a stone or a cup, and scattered wholes made up of sev-
eral disconnected parts, such as a broken glass, a set of suitcases, an archi-
pelago. These distinctions run afoul of mereology and call for concepts and
principles that are distinctively topological. Topology, one might say, is a
natural complement of mereology. It supplies a notion of wholeness to com-
plement the theory of parthood; it supplies a theory of connection besides the
theory of overlap.
                                                
1. See e.g. Plantinga [1975], Wiggins [1979], Van Cleve [1986], Willard [1994].
3Call mereotopology the result of integrating these two theories: the
theory obtained by supplementing the basic mereological apparatus with suf-
ficiently articulated topological distinctions. There is a sense in which th
difference between mereotopology and mereology is only a matter of de-
scriptive or expressive power: mereotopology is more fine-grained than
mereology. But this is hardly a remarkable metaphysical difference. Where
the two theories start to behave differently is in their metaphysical conse-
quences. And this is where the intermingling of space and modality may
reveal unexpected oddities. Regardless of how one feels about mereological
essentialism, if mereology generalizes to mereotopology then it is natural to
inquire about the possible topological extensions of essentialism. We may,
for example, speak of topological essentialism to indicate the strengthening
of Chisholm’s doctrine that results from insisting on the essentiality of an
object’s topology (over and above its mereology). Is the table necessarily in
one piece? Would we have another table were the stump detached from the
board (that very stump and that very board)? Is Sue’s doughnut necessarily
torus-shaped? Would it be something else had its hole shrank out of
existence (e.g., because the doughnut was squeezed into an amorphous
blob)?
The proxies of mereological essentialism in the mereotopological do-
main seem to have interesting and yet unexplored consequences. As in the
case of mereological essentialism, some extrinsic relations turn out to be in-
trinsic relations. (The stump’s being attached to the board becomes an es-
sential property of the stump—and of the board.) But exactly what that
means and exactly what relations are at issue is unclear. What follows is a
first step in the assessment of these matters.
2. MEREOLOGICAL AND TOPOLOGICAL ESSENTIALISM
Let us begin by defining the basic notions.Mereological essentialism is not a
clear-cut thesis, and various formulations have been considered. To represent
some of these formulations in a uniform way, and also to lay out some con-
venient notation for comparisons with other forms of essentialism considered
below, it will be advantageous to have some general way of expressing the
4modal statement that a certain proposition holds in every world in which a
given entity exists. For this purpose, where f  is any formula, we shall rely on
the following general notation:
(1) x f =df (E!x fi  f ).
Here the symbol ‘’ in the definiens is to be understood as the modal op-
erator for necessity and ‘E!’ as the predicate of singular existence, definable
e.g. as in free logic:
(2) E!x =df $y y=x.
So (1) is simply a compact way for expressing the modal statement that f
holds in every world in which x exists. (We may refer to ‘x’ as the rela-
tivization of  to x.)2
Using this notation, we can immediately express the thesis of mereo-
logical essentialism in terms of parthood (‘P’) as follows:
(PE) Pxy fi  y Pxy.
That is, if an entity x is part of an entity y, then x is part of y in every world in
which y exists.3 Note that this can take on different meanings depending on
the properties of ‘P’. Typically this is axiomatized as a reflexive, antisym-
metric, transitive relation (a partial ordering), but there is some disagree-
ment as to what additional properties are characteristic of the parthood rela-
tion. Particularly in modal contexts, the behavior of ‘P’ is far from clear, and
this can be crucial in assessing the full import of (PE). For instance, let ‘O’
stand for the relation of overlap, defined as usual as sharing of a common
part:
                                                
2. This is a modal statement whose intended interpretation presupposes some sort
of possible world semantics. In the spirit of greater generality, one could also consider
formulations of the thesis that are compatible with a counterpart-theoretic understanding of
modality.
3. Some authors would add the requirement that x mus  also exist in those worlds
in which y exists and x is part of y. We shall not consider this part of the story and refer
the reader to Simons [1987], Chapter 7, for discussion. Likewise, we shall ignore here the
variants of mereological essentialism that can be obtained by making parthood interact
with time or with other parameters, as initially suggested by Plantinga [1975].
5(3) Oxy =df $ z(Pzx Ù  Pzy),
Then the analogue of (PE) for ‘O’ yields a natural, alternative formulation of
the thesis of mereological essentialism:
(OE) Oxy ®  y Oxy.
However, it is easy to see that the two formulations are not exactly equivalent
unless parthood is assumed to satisfy the so-called principle of the remain-
der:4
(RP) PPxy ®  $ z(Pzy Ù  Ø Ozx),
where ‘PP’ indicates proper parthood:
(4) PPxy =df Pxy Ù  x ¹  y.
More precisely, (PE) logically implies (OE), but in the absence of (RP) the
converse implication may fail. A counterexample is schematically illustrated
in Figure 1, which features the Hasse diagrams of two mutually accessible
worlds each consisting of three objects a, , and c (parthood relations go up-
hill along the lines). These worlds violate the remainder principle (RP), since
in both cases every part of b overlaps a even though a is a proper part of b.
As a result, the model defined by w and w' falsifies (PE), since a is part of b
in w but not in w'. Yet (OE) holds.
b
a
c
ba
c
w w'
Figure 1: A model satisfying (OE) but not (PE)
                                                
4. This principle is called “Weak Supplementation Principle” by Simons [1987:
29], who considers it a minimal requirement for any partial ordering to deserve the name
of a part. Simons reserves the label “Remainder Principle” for a stronger form asserting
the existence of a unique difference between an entity and any proper part thereof.
6These differences are not without interest, but should not concern us t o
much. It does not matter which of these versions one takes to be rep-
resentative of the view traditionally associated with the label “mereological
essentialism”. (Chisholm himself follows (PE).) Nor is it our purpose here
to assess the viability of these principles. Rather, let us see how these purely
mereological statements can be extended to mereotopological statements.
To this end, let us use ‘C’ as a primitive expressing the topological re-
lation of connection. This is a reflexive and symmetrical relation, like O;
however, on the intended interpretation C is more general than O because
things can be connected even in the absence of sharing of parts.5 Accord-
ingly, one can define various distinctively topological notions such as exter-
nal connection (EC), tangential part (TP), boundary part (BP), or internal part
(IP):
(5) ECxy =df Cxy Ù  Ø Oxy
(6) TPxy =df Pxy Ù  $ z(ECzx Ù  ECzy)
(7) BPxy =df " z(Pzx Ù  TPzy)
(8) IPxy =df Pxy Ù Ø TPxy
We can then immediately consider two versions of topological essen-
tialism, corresponding to (PE) and (OE) respectively. The first can be for-
mulated in terms of the relation of interior parthood, IP (tangential parthood
would do as well):
(IPE) IPxy ®  y IPxy.
The other can be formulated in terms of the connection relation C:
(CE) Cxy ®  y Cxy.
Also in this case, the two formulations are not equivalent. In fact neither im-
plies the other unless ‘C’ is constrained by additional axioms. More in-
terestingly, note that although C includes O and P includes IP, there are no
analogous inclusion relations between the corresponding essentialist princi-
ples. Concerning C and O, consider first two externally connected objects
                                                
5. The exact characterization of ‘C’ is itself a matter of controversy. See Varzi
[1996] and Smith [1996] for an examination of the issues involved.
7that are, in another world, disconnected: (OE) is vacuously satisfied, but (CE)
fails (case (i) in Figure 2). On the other hand, consider two overlapping ob-
jects that are, in another world, externally connected. (CE) is satisfied but
(OE) is falsified (case (ii)). Concerning IP and P, consider first an object
which, in some world, loses some of its boundary parts: (IPE) is vacuously
satisfied but (PE) fails (case (iii)). On the other hand, consider an object
whose internal parts become, in another world, tangential parts: (PE) is satis-
fied but (IPE) is falsified (case (iv)).
(i)
w
w'
(ii)
w
w'
(iii)
w
w'
(iv)
w
w'
Figure 2: Relative independence of mereotopological essentialist principles
There are also stronger (conceptually, if not logically) forms of topo-
logical essentialism that one might consider. For instance, one could hold
that external connection is a binding relation, in the sense that if two entities
are externally connected, then they are necessarily so:
(ECE) ECxy ®  y ECxy.
Likewise for all the other interesting mereotopological relations that can be
defined in terms of ‘P’ and ‘C’, which we need not consider here.
At this point the extended picture of essentialism begins to look non-
trivial. There are innocent cases of extension of mereological essentialism to
topological essentialism. For instance, the necessity of overlap just is the ne-
cessity of (non-external) connection. (If your left hand necessarily overlaps
your body, then your left hand is necessarily connected to your body.) That
is simply a matter of definitions. The qualifying case is that of external con-
nection (EC). This is logically included in connection, like overlap, hence the
8necessity of external connection extends to the necessity of connection. But
surely one would like to say that two objects that are actually attached could
lie apart from each other. One would like to say that the hand could be de-
tached from the rest of the body. Thus, even if one accepted mereological
essentialism, one would seem to have obvious reasons for rejecting at least
some of its topological extensions.
3. TOPOLOGICAL ESSENTIALISM REVISITED
Well, are these reasons so obvious? What notion do we have of things that
are connected? Prototypical examples are constituted by a thing and its geo-
metric complement (the entity that results when we imagine the thing as hav-
ing been subtracted from the universe as a whole); or by the interior of an
object and its boundary; or perhaps by a hole and its material host (like the
hole in Sue’s doughnut). In the temporal realm, typical examples are two
successive events such as a process and the event starting with the process’s
culmination. In general, if connection is understood in the spirit of ordinary
topology, then external connection is a relation that can only hold between
two entities one of which is closed by a boundary (in the contact area) and
the other is “open” (in the same area). In all of these cases the thesis of
topological essentialism does not sound unreasonable. If it is plausible to say
that the parts of an object are essential to it, then it is likewise plausible to say
that its complement is essential to it, or that its interior is essent al to its
boundary (and so on). We are not saying that this is the correct view: it is
hardly controversial on a de dicto reading, since on the intended interpreta-
tion of these terms nothing can lie between an entity x and the rest of the uni-
verse (at least, this is true as long as the connection relation is assumed to
satisfy certain plausible conditions); but on a de re reading there is ample
room for controversy. Even so, the idea that the connection between an entity
and its complement (or between a boundary and its interior) has the modal
force of necessity is not in itself utterly implausible—not any more implausi-
ble than mereological essentialism.
The cases in which the principle(s) of topological essentialism do sound
implausible arise when the things whose contact is said to be necessary are
9ordinary objects, such as a book and the shelf it stands on, or a painting and
the wall it hangs on. There is indeed a lot of prima facie mplausiblility in the
statement that these things are necessarily touching—that the book could not
be on a different shelf, or that the painting could not be hanging on a differ-
ent wall. There is a lot of implausibility in the thesis that the book or the
painting would literally cease to exist or no longer be what they are upon re-
moving them from the shelf or the wall with which they are presently in con-
tact. But on closer inspection, these are not counterexamples to topological
essentialism, in any of its forms. They are not counterexamples because the
relevant relation of contact here is not one of topological connection. The
book and the shelf, or the painting and the wall, are not externally connected.
They are very close; but closeness is no mark for connection. (The book and
the shelf, or the painting and the wall, do not make up connected units, things
in one piece.)
To be sure, natural language does not distinguish between these two
senses of “connection”, between true topological connection and mere
physical closeness. In general, the surfaces of distinct physical objects can-
not be topologically connected, though the objects may of course be so close
to each other that they appear to be truly connected to the naked eye. They
are, as we may say, quasi-connected (QC). And this is not a case covered by
(IPE) or (CE). We can, of course, express a correspondingly strong essen-
tialist principle to the effect that any two things that are quasi-connected are
so in all worlds in which they exist:
(QCE) QCxy ®  y QCxy.
But this is no innocent topological extension of mereological essential-
ism. It is a much stronger and independent, substantive thesis—a form of
metric essentialism whose rebuttal would not affect the question of the plau-
sibility of topological essentialism, and which therefore does not have much
bearing on the question of the relationship between mereology and topology.
Our initial example of your two hands touching also falls into this case. In
any event, even in this regard one could find some plausibility in the essen-
tialist thesis, at least relative to certain kinds of entity. Would that mosaic be
the same if the tesserae were arranged differently? Would that Tinkertoy
house be the same if the Tinkertoys were arranged in totally different way?
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Would this beautiful bunch of flowers be the same if the flowers were scat-
tered all over the floor?
There is, finally, the case of contact between two parts of a given object,
such as your hand and the rest of your body, or two halves of a solid sphere.
They are connected. Are they necessarily so? Here it seems that the intuitive
plausibility of an affirmative answer would indeed mark a much stronger
commitment than mereological essentialism. It seems quite plausible to
maintain that the two halves are essential to the sphere without entertaining
the additional view that they cannot be separated—that the sphere cannot be
cut in half. We agree with this. But, once again, we would like to suggest that
things look different on closer inspection. Surely the two parts can be de-
tached (no essentialist thesis would deny that the sphere is divisibl). The
question is whether they would survive the separation—whether the con-
nected halves are the same things as the disconnected halves. Equiva-
lently, the question is whether the sphere survives the cut—whether the con-
nected sphere and the split sphere are one and the same thing. It would seem
natural to answer these questions in the affirmative. After all, nothing hap-
pened to the two halves, except for a change in their extrinsic, relational prop-
erties. And how could a mere “Cambridge change” result in a substantial
change?6 However, this is hasty if our concern is with topological facts, for
topological relations need not be of the Cambridge variety. The splitting
transforms the two halves into full-fledged, complete, maximally connected
things. Two entities that were only partly bounded by a surface now are
completely bounded and perfectly separated from their complement. Or, if
you prefer, two merely potential entities have become actual. On either
view, the change is remarkably substantial: the parts remain the same, but
the boundaries change. And to say that nothing happened, to deny that
the two halves undergo a dramatic change, is to beg the question. If a mereo-
logist can be struck by microscopic mereological changes, a mereotopolo-
gist has all the reasons to be struck by such macroscopic topological
changes.
                                                
6. A recent formulation of this sort of thinking can be found in Denkel [1995] co -
tra Burke [1994]. See also van Inwagen [1981]. The intuition can already be found in
Philo of Alexandria’s criticism of the Stoic puzzle of Theon and Deon: see Sedley [1982].
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Nor should one be puzzled by the role played by surfaces in this ac-
count. There is a natural worry that reference to surfaces may give rise to un-
solvable philosophical conundrums: what happens to the surface when we
cut an object in half? Which of the two halves is going to inherit the property
of being topologically closed? This is indeed a problem if we think that dis-
secting a solid reveals matter in its interior and “brings to light new sur-
faces”, as Adams [1984: 400] nicely put it. But this is not the right intuition
here. Rather, the model we should have in mind, if we wish to understand
what happens topologically when the sphere is cut in half, is that of a split-
ting oil drop: eventually the right and left portions split, and we have two
drops, each with its own complete boundary. (Think also of a soap bubble
splitting.) There is nothing mysterious in this process, except for the fact that
an abrupt topological change (much more dramatic than a mere Cambridge
change) takes place.7
With all this, topological essentialism appears to be stronger but in no
way stranger than its pure mereological counterpart. The last case is the only
one where one would need additional grounds for arguing from mereological
essentialism to the thesis that the two halves of a sphere cannot be separated.
But even so, this brief discussion shows that such additional grounds are a
rather natural extension of whatever grounds one could ffer in favor of
mereological essentialism.
4. WHEN MEREOLOGY FORCES TOPOLOGY
The link between mereological and topological essentialism becomes espe-
cially vivid once we realize that some topological facts are already made nec-
essary by the assumption of mereological essentialism. This at least is true if
mereology is assumed to be strong enough to satisfy the principle of the re-
mainder (RP).
Consider internal parthood (IP). If x is in the interior of y in the actual
world w, then y cannot become an interior part of x. This follows directly
from mereological essentialism via the transitivity of parthood and the princi-
                                                
7. This point is argued in detail in Varzi [1997].
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ple of the remainder. For if x is in the interior of y, then by (RP) there must
exist some part z of y which does not overlap x. Now suppose there is a
world w' in which y is contained in x. In this world, z would have to be a
proper part of x by transitivity; but then, it should be necessarily so by mere-
ological essentialism.8 Thus, in particular, z would have to be part of x in the
initial world w, contrary to the assumption. Hence if x is contained in the in-
terior of y in w, x cannot contain y in any world accessible from w. And this
is a matter of de re necessity.
Another interesting case is the necessary asymmetry of tangential
parthood (TP). If x is a tangential part of y, then ycannot be a tangential part
of x. (Proof along the same lines.) The reason for the irreversibilty of internal
and tangential parthood lies, of course, in the asymmetry of proper parthood.
Joined with the remainder principle and mereological essentialism, this
freezes the nesting of parts. Hence, in particular, it freezes the asymmetries
corresponding to interior and tangential proper parthood. On the other hand,
the asymmetry of proper parthood does not freeze the relativ  position f
parts, and that is why such principles as (IPE) of (CE) do not follow from
mereological essentialism: even in the presence of the remainder principle,
the formal properties of proper parthood are not enough to ensure the de r
necessity of interior parthood or, more generally, to fix the de renecessity of
the parts’ relative positions. (See again case (iv) in Figure 2.) These are in-
dependent topological necessities.
For a third example, consider again the relation of connection between
an entity and its mereological complement. As we have seen, the de dicto ne-
cessity of this relation is trivial: whatever the modal variations of this object
or this complement, nothing can ever lie between an object and the rest of the
universe. The de re variant of the object/complement necessary connection
is more controversial. But it, too, turns out to be a consequence of mereologi-
cal essentialism as long as certain minimal assumptions are made concern-
ing the logical structure of parthood. It is enough to assume the remainder
principle (RP) along with the—rather innocent—assumption of the exis-
tence of the universe (the mereological sum of all there is in a world). For
                                                
8. Here we are assuming the relation of accessibility among worlds to be sym-
metric.
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consider a world w in which yis the complement of x. If in another world w'
it turns out that y is no longer in contact with x, t en there must be a part of
the universe, z, which belongs neither to x nor to y. By (PE), z must be a part
of the universe in w too. Therefore it must overlap either x, or y, or both. But
if it does, it is a contingent fact, as shown by w', and this is ruled out by
(OE).
5. SPHERES AND DOUGHNUTS
There are other senses in which topological essentialism may not seem un-
reasonable, for there are other forms of top logical essentialism besides
those expressed by modal statements such as (CE), (IPE), (ECE), and the
like. These statements express a clear sense in which the essentialist position
can be extended from mereology to mereotopology by insisting on the es-
sentiality of such characteristic relations as interior parthood, tangential
parthood, etc. However, one can also think of the essentiality of topological
properties of a different sort, such as the properties as being topologically
sphere-like, doughnut-like, and so on—in short, those properties that deter-
mine the topological genus of an object. Correspondingly, one can formulate
principles of topological essentialism that force the genus of an object to be
the same in every possible world. This is the sort of essentialism that arises
in relation to our initial questions about Sue’s doughnut.
There are, again, a de dicto and a de re formulation of such principles.
Let us write ‘Dx’ for ‘x is a doughnut’ and ‘Hyx’ for ‘y is a hole in x’.
Then we could express the de dicto formulation as follows:
(D) " x(Dx ®  $ y Hyx)
This seems uncontroversial (if not analytically valid). Surely you cannot have
a holeless doughnut, for having a hole is part of being a doughnut: in every
world in which you have a doughnut, you have a hole in it (just as in every
world and for every husband there is a corresponding wife.) There is nothing
peculiar about topology here, and there are perfectly comparable forms of de
dicto mereological necessity: surely you cannot have a sphere with the right
half removed. A truncated sphere is just not a sphere.
The interesting questions arise with the de re formulation. Given a
14
doughnut, is it true of it—of that particular object—that it could not exist
without its hole—that very particular hole? To be sure we can specify this
claim in at least two different ways:
(DE1) Dx ®  x $ y Hyx
(DE2) Dx ®  $ y x Hyx
The first of these is a weaker claim, as it says nothing about whether a given
doughnut could have a different hole from the one it actually has. The sec-
ond is a much stronger claim and rules out the possibility that a doughnut
could be perforated by a different hole: in every world in which you can find
Sue’s doughnut, you will also find the very same hole that it has in this
world. Both claims of course have various generalizations, concerning for
instance the number of holes in an object and eventually also its topology (a
doughnut with a knotted hole). Here we may content ourselves with the sim-
ple cases.
Is either of these theses acceptable? On one intuition they are both too
strong. If you open up a doughnut (e.g., by cutting it on one side) the hole
goes, the doughnut stays. That is, the object is still there, and you can still eat
it all, though its shape is now different. This would contrast both (DE1) and
(DE2). On the other hand, there is no a priori reason why this commonsensi-
cal intuition should be regarded as a reductio ad absurdum of either (DE1)
or (DE2). Concerning (DE1), there is actually a close connection between
this and the topological essentialist theses expressed by (CE) and (ECE). If
you open up the doughnut, some parts that were connected become discon-
nected. So if (CE) or (ECE) hold, (DE1) must hold too. (However the con-
verse need not be true, hence (DE1) is effectively less committing than the
other theses.)
Figure 3. Opening up a doughnut kills the hole in it. Does the doughnut survive?
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Moreover, there is also a connection between (DE1) and the mereologi-
cal essentialist theses expressed by (PE) and (OE). The hole in a doughnut is
part of the doughnut’s complement, and a tangential part at that. Thus, to the
extent that the relation of external connection between every object and its
complement is a de re necessity that follows from mereological essentialism
(as seen in the previous section), to that extent the relation of external con-
nection between a doughnut and its hole is itself a matter of de re necessity
supported by mereological essentialism. So if (PE) and (OE) hold, (DE1)
must hold too.
These considerations do not extend to (DE2). Yet also in that case ref-
erence to common sense and intuitions is hardly a way to settle the issue. If
the thesis that the each part of the doughnut is essential to it can survive the
cry of common sense, so may the thesis that the hole—that very hole—is
also essential.9
Of course, each of (D), (DE1), and (DE2) was phrased in terms of a bi-
nary predicate, ‘H’, which reflects a reifying attitude towards holes: holes are
entities of a kind and can stand in various relations with the other specimens
of the ontological fauna. This is a view that we have defended elsewhere.10
However we can also imagine an expression of the form ‘$ yHyx’ to be a
metalinguistic abbreviation for a complex expression attributing to x the
property of being perforated, “without any implication that perforation is due
to the presence of occult, immaterial entities” (as Argle once put it 11). On
this account, the possession of a hole by a doughnut would simply be a fa-
çon de parler, and “there are holes in ...” would be an innocuous shape
predicate like “... is a doughnut”. This has no consequences for the de dicto
                                                
9. If one thinks of holes as negative parts (as suggested e.g. by Hofmann and Rich-
ards [1985]), then the entire story here would reduce to plain mereological essentialism.
That hole would be necessarily in that doughnut insofar as the hole is a part of the dough-
nut—a negative part. Rather than an advantage, however, we take this to be an element
against such an account of holes: there is an important distinction here—a distinction re-
flected in the possibility of endorsing topological essentialism without endorsing mere-
ological essentialism, or vice versa. And this distinction is obscured by a negative-
mereological treatment of holes.
10. See Casati and Varzi [1994].
11. See Lewis and Lewis [1970].
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principle (D), which in fact becomes synonymous with the tatementthat
necessarily a doughnut is a doughnut. However the status of the de re prin-
ciples changes on this account. For one thing, the strong formulation (DE2)
becomes meaningless (syntactically ill-formed). As for (DE1), the thesis re-
mains intelligible, but it becomes an instance of a more general thesis to the
effect that an object must necessarily have the shape it has. If sameness of
shape is understood topologically (i.e., modulo topological equivalence), then
the result is equivalent to (DE2), and bears the same relations to the other
essentialist principles of mereology and topology that were noted above. If,
by contrast, sameness of shape is taken literally, then the result is a much
stringer thesis, which may be labeled morphological essentialism. Can an
object have a different shape than the one it has? Does it cease to exist when
its shape changes? Whether this is metaphysically acceptable, or when it is
acceptable if at all, is a new question—another step into the intricate inter-
mingling of space and modality.
6. LOCATIVE ESSENTIALISM
We can go even further in that direction. Consider strengthening the link
between an object and the region of space at which it is located by asserting
the necessity of location. This yields a form of locative ssentialism which is
stronger than any form of spatial essentialism considered so far. To be more
precise, let ‘L’ indicate the relation between an object x d “its” region of
space, rx: Basic features of this relation are injectivity (if Lxy and Lxz then
y=z, so that location is, in this sense, exact location) and conditional reflexiv-
ity (regions are located at themselves).12 Then the thesis of locative essen-
tialism can be stated thus:
(LE) Lxy ®  x Lxy.
That is, an object that happens to be located at a certain region is necessarily
located there, whenever it exists.
Note that (LE) implies that no object can survive with impunity a rear-
                                                
12. For a more detailed treatment of this relation, see Casati and Varzi [1996].
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rangement of its parts. This is stronger than mereological essentialism (PE)
and topological essentialism (CE), since a rearrangement of parts need not
carry a loss of parts—violating (PE)—or a change in the topology of the
object—violating (CE). For instance, in figure 4, one can observe a displace-
ment of parts with no mereological or topological change. This would falsify
(LE) while being compatible with both (PE) and (CE).
Figure 4. (PE)–(OE) and (CE)–(IPE) are preserved; (LE) fails.
Now, like its mereotopological analogues, principle (LE) expresses d
re modalities. There are, to be sure, weaker de dicto versions of locative es-
sentialism, which can be formulated in terms of the region operator r. For
instance, the following gives a d  dicto counterpart of (LE),
(L) " x" y (rx=y ®  Lxy),
and this is obvious. Surely x is located at y whenever y qualifies as the region
at which x is located. This is the same sort of triviality that we encountered in
the de dicto versions of the other principles. The corresponding d  re forms
are certainly questionable principles. Presumably the painting that is now on
that wall could have also been on this wall. And presumably the book that is
now on the shelf could very well have been on the coffee table. To deny this
seems to be an intolerably severe position—certainly much more severe than
the position expressed by the above principles of topological essentialism, let
alone mereological essentialism. As a matter of fact we are not aware of any
philosophers who ever held such views. But consider, for an analogy, van
Inwagen’s words about the temporal case:
It is bad enough to suppose that the replacement of a rusty bolt leaves me
with what is, “in the strict philosophical sense”, a new car. It is infinitely
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worse, and never had the phrase ‘infinitely worse’ been used more ap-
propriately, to suppose that when I sit in my car and turn the wheel, what
I am occupying is, “in the strict philosophical sense”, a compact series
of infinitesimally differing cars. [1990: 77-78].
This statement can be rephrased to match our concerns. It is very bad to sup-
pose that, had the wheel of my car been three degrees more to the left than it
actually is, the car would have been another entity.
Similar considerations apply, it would seem, to various other forms of
locative essentialism that could now be formulated, thanks to the many dis-
tinctions afforded by a mereotopological vocabulary. For instance, one could
consider weakenings of (LE) to the effect that if the region occupied by an
object x stands in a certain relation S with the region occupied by another
object y, then it must necessarily stand in that relation. The generating
scheme is
(S LE) S rxry ®  xS rxry.
where S is any mereotopological predicate such as ‘P’, ‘IP’, ‘O’, ‘C’,
and the like. Statements of this form are generally weaker than (LE) (except
when y is a region and S is the identity relation, which gives (LE) as a
special case). Yet van Inwagen’s misgivings would still seem to apply: it is
infinitely hard to imagine that the car you are sitting in would be a other
thing had its region not been, say, an interior part of the region occupied by
the garage.
Is there any use for these forms of essentialism, then? Note the differ-
ence between (SLE) and the forms of topological or metric essentialism ex-
emplified by (CE) and (QCE). Those are principles concerning the relative
positions of certain objects: (CE) demands that two halves of a sphere be
necessarily in contact with each other, but leaves room for the possibility that
they jointly move around in the environment; (QCE) demands that the book
be necessarily on the shelf, or that the tesserae of the mosaic be necessarily
arranged as they are, but leaves room for the ideal possibility that the book be
moved along with the shelf, or that the mosaic be somewhere else (insofar as
this does not collide with other essentialist facts). By contrast, (S LE) con-
cerns the relative position of spatial regions. Now, on the de dicto reading,
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this is much more exorbitant than any of the above: (S LE) ecomes a thesis
to the effect that things cannot be elsewhere—whether individuallyor to-
gether with other entities in the environment, a thesis beside which even the
strongest forms of mereological and topological essentialism pale. However,
on a de re reading (S LE) is commensurable to the corresponding forms of
topological or metric essentialism. In fact, insofar as spatial regions are enti-
ties of a kind, (S LE) says neither more nor less that those entities are neces-
sarily S -related, which is what (CE) and the like say. (A relationalist about
space could hold analogue views, though the actual content of the principles
would of course be different. Specifically, one can obtain relationist ana-
logues of the principles of locative essentialism by replacing each occurrence
of a binary predication ‘Lxy’ with the idiom ‘L*x’ that gives its relationist
translation.)
On a de re reading, then, (S LE) is not an independent thesis. Just as
mereology forces certain topological facts, so topology forces certain locative
facts—those facts that concern the location of spatial regions. This yields an
asymmetry between (S LE) and (LE), since (LE) was seen to be independent
of both mereological and topological essentialism. It does not follow, how-
ever, that (LE) is unintelligible. Consider then a purely spatial model—a
model in which every world is inhabited exlusively by regions of space (in-
cluding Space, the fusion of all these regions). Assume both mereological
and topological essentialism, in any of the forms discussed above. Then the
corresponding instances of (S LE) are true. But then (LE) must also be true.
For this principle states that regions cannot be located elsewhere. So how can
it be violated, if the only interpretaton of this ‘elsewhere’ is given in term of
localization itself?
Figure 5. In a spatial domain, (LE) supervenes on (PE)–(OE) and (CE)–(IPE).
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There is—we may say—a holistic character in the decomposition of
space into regions. In a spatial domain, the difference between the two chess-
boards in figure 5 is merely decorative, for regions cannot be anywhere else
than where they themselves are. In a spatial domain, the distinction between
de re and de dicto reading of (LE) collapses, and the entire essentialist story
supervenes on matters of mereology and topology.
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